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Abstract 
Japan’s seemingly monolithic protectionist farm policies were often easily moderated 
by external pressures. This study analyzes the change of the degree and the methods of 
protectionist farm policies, focusing on Japan’s most important crop, rice. It calculates 
consumer surplus, producer surplus and government spending in the past fifty years and 
integrates  these figures into one diagram utilizing the STC (surplus transformation 
curve) analysis, developed by Bruce Gardner in 1983. 
     The result of the analyses suggests that external pressures have a considerable 
impact on domestic protectionist farm policies. For example, in 1986 when the demand 
by the RMA (Rice Milling Association) in the U.S. that Japan should open its rice 
market was issued, the STC diagram clearly shows that the level of protection estimated 
from the international market price diminished. Nevertheless, at that time the level of 
protection estimated from the domestic equilibrium did not fall. This implies that the 
government successfully pretended to resist external pressure, but in reality reduced the 
level of protection, considering the US demands.  Furthermore,  in  1994  when  the 
Uruguay  Round  agreement was finalized, the STC diagram also shows that Japan’s 
acceptance reduced its level of protection. The level of protection estimated from the 
domestic equilibrium was also  reduced at the same time.  These two observations 
suggest that external pressures distinctly affect the degree of protectionist farm policies, 
while the method of protection depends on domestic political conditions. 
 
JEL classification: Q18, Q11 
Key words: Surplus Transformation Curve, Japan’s rice policy, acreage control, external 
pressure 
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Introduction 
 
Japan’s seemingly monolithic protectionist farm policies were often easily moderated 
by external pressures. In fact, in 1986, the  demands  from  the  RMA  (Rice Milling 
Association) in the U.S. that Japan should open its rice market had a strong impact on 
the public opinions concerning protectionist farm policies, entailing several reforms in 
protectionist farm policies, even though the request was eventually withdrawn by the 
US government. In 1993, the Blair-house Agreement (1992) between the U.S. and the 
EU urged Japan to accept the final resolution of the GATT. This acceptance entailed not 
only increasing rice importation as minimum access but also affecting several domestic 
policies, which ended up diminishing the level of protection. 
    This study analyzes the change of the degree and the methods of protectionist farm 
policies, focusing on Japan’s most important crop, rice. It calculates consumer surplus, 
producer surplus and government spending in the past fifty years and integrates these 
figures into one diagram utilizing the STC  (surplus transformation curve)  analysis, 
developed by Bruce Gardner in 1983. 
     The  direct  purpose  of  this study is to examine how external pressures affect 
protectionist farm policies. The indirect objective is to consider the prospect of Japan’s 
participation in TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership), one of the key issues of which is how 
to  deal with damage to  the agricultural sector, especially the rice industry, if trade 
barriers are completely removed. Whether Japan makes a decision to participate in TPP 
heavily depends upon the implications for farm policies. 
 
Theoretical framework 
Significance of applying the STC analysis to Japan’s rice policy   3 
 
The STC analysis, having been pioneered by Gardner (1983) during the 1980’s US farm 
policy, is well suited to a comparison between acreage control and government 
payments. Although it may be considered quite  old-fashioned in a discussion of 
contemporary US farm policies, it is expected to be an effective analytical tool for the 
present state of Japan’s rice policy. 
     Japan’s rice production has been under acreage control for the last 40 years. In 
addition to that, the method of acreage control was recently changed from the 
European-style mandate to the American-style voluntary method, in which farmers can 
select whether to participate in the program or not, considering the level of 
compensation  payment to participant farmers.  Nevertheless,  in spite of this reform 
slightly loosening the regulation from a mandated to a voluntary system, farmers have 
been fed up with this long-lasting, insufferable government regulation. The opinion that 
such a program should be completely eliminated is mounting not only among farmers 
but also in business circles, in which leaders in many industries expect that the abolition 
of this program would result in reducing the rice price. 
    It is of urgent necessity for Japanese government and economists to consider the 
advantages and disadvantages of  maintaining  the status quo, that is, continuing  the 
acreage control program, or alternatively of introducing drastic reform such as direct 
payments  or other subsidy measures instead. In this context, the STC analysis is 
expected to wield clear analytical power for a comparison of these options in Japan’s 
rice policy. 
 
Modifications for applying the STC to Japan’s rice policy 
   4 
Although the STC analysis is expected to be an effective analytical tool for the present 
situation of Japan’s rice policy, it is necessary to make several modifications in order to 
improve the method’s suitability for some unique characteristics of Japan’s rice policy. 
Mainly, there are two points which require modification. 
    First, the STC analysis was originally intended to compare single policy measures, 
that is, the acreage control and the production subsidy. However, in this paper, it is 
modified to compare not single measures but several policy mixes. For instance, from 
1970 to 1994, the adopted policy was a policy mix of a two-tier price system and an 
acreage control  program. From 1996  to 2003,  the adopted policy was  a  mix  of  an 
acreage control program and a subsidy for production. Originally, it was presumed that 
each single policy measure has a unique line in a STC diagram. Yet here, it will be 
assumed that a policy mix consisting of several policy measures has an individual line 
in a STC diagram. 
    Secondly,  the STC analysis  was originally intended  to trace  a  series of 
consequences when the degree of a certain protective policy measure was enhanced. 
However, in the present study, it is modified to trace the time-series shifts of various 
policy mixes.  Such an analysis not only examines  the degree of protectionist farm 
policy in each year but also the features of various policy mixes. For instance, the 
comparison between 1969 and 1970 simultaneously means the comparison between the 
two-tier price system alone and the two-tier price system with acreage control. 
 
Model and Methodology 
Framework 
 
Under a partial equilibrium framework, consumer surplus, producer surplus and   5 
government spending on the rice market was calculated. 
     In order to estimate these figures, simple formulas for a demand function and a 
supply function are derived as follows: 
Qd = A・P
εd  Qs = B・P
εs 
The levels of elasticity of these two functions were given by a priori information based 
on previous studies as follows
1
εd = -0.2899、εs = 0.4405 
: 
The other parameters, A and B, were calculated by substituting each year’s observed 
amounts and prices for P and Q. 
     In the process of this calculation, it is crucial to accurately estimate the amount of 
supply (potential production) under the current price because it is not directly observed. 
The gap between the real amount of production and the potential production cannot be 
estimated from the nominal reduction rate of rice production in each year released by 
the government. A considerable amount of land that might be expected to potentially 
produce rice has already become worn out because of lack of care to preserve fertility. 
Consequently,  such land should not be counted as potentially productive. Specific 
surveys were conducted in 41 prefectures and the substantial production potential was 
carefully estimated
2
    The point of intersection  of  the  two function curves in each year marks the 
. 
                                                   
1  According to Kusakari (1998), the price elasticity of the rice demand function at the 
retail market was estimated as -0.3349. We scrutinized the data related to the retail and 
wholesale markets and converted it to -0.2899 as the elasticity at the wholesale market. 
According to Fujiki (1998), the price elasticity of the rice supply function at the farm 
gate stage was estimated as 0.45. We examined the date related to the production and 
wholesale stages and converted it to 0.4405 as the elasticity at the wholesale market. 
2  The author visited main rice production areas for field surveys and interviewed 
competent local officials in charge of rice production. The ratio of the number of 
prefectures visited in these surveys to total prefectures in Japan is 41/47. However, the 
ratio of the covered paddies or the covered amount of production is no less than 98%.   6 
domestic market equilibrium. The equilibrium price and the equilibrium amount can be 
calculated by solving simultaneous equations derived from the functions above. The real 
market price and the real farmer’s revenue received  per unit are different from the 
equilibrium price. By estimating the gap between the equilibrium price and the real 
prices that a farmer receives or a consumer spends, the amounts of consumer surplus 
and producer surplus in  each year measured by the domestic equilibrium were 
calculated. Similarly, by estimating the gap between the international market price and 
the real prices observed in the market distorted by government intervention, the amount 
of those surpluses measured by the international market price were calculated. 
 
Model and estimation of the surplus 
 
In this paper, four types of model were built according to the period in which different 
policy mixes were employed to protect farmers. 
    First, the policy mix adopted during the periods 1970-1973, and 1978-2007 is 
represented as Model A, explained as follows: 
(The formulas shown here are those estimated from the domestic equilibrium. It can 
easily be changed to those estimated from the international market price by substituting 
Pw for Pe.) 
 
The amount of the reduction of the consumer surplus: 
－ΔCS =  －∫
Pc
Pe Qd (P) dP 
The amount of the increase of the producer surplus: 
＋ΔPS =  －{∫
Pe
Mc Qs (P) dP  －  (Pe－Mc)×Qa }  ＋  (Ps－Pe)×Qa 
Government spending:   7 
－ΔGS =  －(Ps－Pc)×Qa 
 
This amount of consumer surplus is represented using a primitive function as follows: 
∫Qd (P) dP = F(P); 
－ΔCS =  －{[F(P)]
Pc－[F(P)]
Pe} 
Similarly, the amount of producer surplus is represented using a primitive function as 
follows: 
∫Qs (P) dP = G(P); 
＋ΔPS =  －{[G(P)]
Pe  －  [G(P)]
Mc  －  (Pe－Mc)×Qa }  ＋  (Ps－Pe)×Qa 





    The situation of policy mix during  the period 1974-1977  can be appropriately 
represented by Model B. During this period, the acreage control program was conducted 
as in other years. Nonetheless, the cutback of the production was so moderate that the 
reduced amount was still larger than the equilibrium amount. Principally, the formula to 
calculate Model  B  is similar to that of Model  A,  except for  one major difference, 
depicted in Figure 1B. 
    Prior  to the start of the acreage control program, the protectionist farm policy 
depended alone upon the two-tier price system. In this period, even consumers as well 
as producers were protected  by the government spending. Under this two-tier price 




Pe Qd (P) dP 
＋ΔPS = ∫
Ps
Pe Qs (P) dP   8 
－ΔGS =  －(Ps－Pc)×Qs 
 
    During the period 1965-1969, the policy measures differed from those during the 
period 1955-1964. Although the two-tier price system was employed in the same way, 
the supply apparently exceeded the demand. As a result, the government stockpile of 
rice had been accumulated year by year. Thus, Model D is modified from the Model C, 
only revising the formula of the government spending as follows
3
－ΔGS =  －(Ps－Pc)×Qd  －(Ps－Pw)×(Qs－Qd) 
: 
 
Thus, four types of model were built in order to appropriately illustrate the policy mixes 
implemented in each period. Figure 1 depicts those situations. 
 
Other methodologies 
(1) Division of the observation period 
 
Throughout the observation period, policy mixes frequently changed. For the purpose of 
lucidly examining the change of policy mix, it is useful to divide the observation period 
into several phases. 
    Phase 1 (1955-1964): two-tier price system alone without overproduction 
    Phase 2 (1965-1969): two-tier price system alone with overproduction 
    Phase 3 (1970-1977): two-tier price system with acreage control; “unstable stage” 
    Phase 4 (1978-1986): two-tier price system with acreage control; “stable stage” 
    Phase 5 (1987-1995):  two-tier price system with acreage control;  “transitional 
                                                   
3  A large amount of budget for disposing of an excess government stock was needed 
during this period.   9 
stage” 
    Phase 6 (1996-2003): acreage control with a slight subsidy for production 
    Phase 7 (2004-present): acreage control without subsidy 
Note: Phase 3 includes two types of model. From 1970 to1973, Model A was adopted 
while from 1974 to 1977, Model B was adopted. In spite of difference with regard to the 
model type, these years have been combined and integrated into one phase, because this 
period has a common characteristic of institutional instability. 
 
(2) Dealing with losses due to payment of taxes 
 
With regard to how to deal with subsidies or other government payments in the 
calculation of STC, whether losses due to payment of taxes should be considered or not 
is crucial in determining  advantages and disadvantages of  various policy measures. 
Generally, consumer-burden type policy measures such as price support are inefficient 
because of large dead weight loss, while taxpayer-burden type policy measures such as 
direct payments are efficient if a simple calculation without a consideration of that loss 
is adopted. Nonetheless, if the tax losses were taken into consideration, the efficiency of 
taxpayer-burden type policy measures would suffer more seriously, while consumer- 
burden type policy measures would be little affected. 
   Considering these prospects, in this paper, calculations  for both cases were 
conducted. 
    Gardner (1983) pointed out the problem of the loss due to payment of taxes and 
argued that such a loss should be taken into consideration as a social opportunity cost, 
though he did not mention a concrete figure for the ratio of such a loss. Alston and Hurd 
(1990) also addressed the importance of this loss and closely examine the features of   10 
each STC line’s locus for various policy measures by taking the loss into consideration, 
though they also did not mention a concrete figure. Alston and James (2002) developed 
this close examination further and arrived at several concrete figures related to this loss 
based on previous studies, from around 10% to 25%. 
     Gardner (2002) reviewed previous studies highlighting the estimation of Fullerton 
(1991). Gardner evaluated Fullerton’s estimation, 25%, as “reasonable.” In this paper, 
we followed Gardner’s evaluation and adopted “25%” as the ratio of the loss due to 
payment of taxes. 
 
(3) Depicting STC lines 
 
The original STC is illustrated in Figure 2. The horizontal axis represents the amount of 
total consumer surplus above the international market price minus government spending. 
The vertical axis represents the amount of total producer surplus above the international 
market price. The detailed inset is shown in the right-hand upper corner of the chart in 
order to easily distinguish the changes of surplus. The equilibrium point, e, is moved on 
the horizontal axis in order to show the amount of the change of surplus from the 




(4) Decomposing the burden of protecting producers 
 
The advantage of the STC analysis is that the income transfer can be clearly depicted in 
one diagram by combining the burden of protection shouldered by several sources, such 
as consumer surplus reduction, government spending, and dead weight loss. However, 
                                                   
4  This method of representation was adopted in Kola (1993).   11 
this combining process at the same time becomes a disadvantage. The STC analysis 
alone does not provide information related to the degree of burdens shouldered by each 
source. 
    In this paper, in order to compensate for this disadvantage of the STC analysis, a 
diagram showing the decomposition of the burden incurred by protecting producers is 
provided. In particular, the consumer surplus reduction is further decomposed into the 





The results of the STC analysis are shown at Figures 3A, 3B, 4A and 4B. Two figures, 
3A and 3B, represent the surpluses calculated from the international market price, while 
the other two figures, 4A and 4B, represent the surpluses calculated from the domestic 
equilibrium. Figures 3A and 4A illustrate the results without considering the loss due to 
payment of taxes, while Figures 3B and 4B show the results considering that loss. 
    To begin with, viewing a general tendency, the level of protection had increased 
from 1955 to 1969 and then acreage control was introduced in 1970. Whereas 
incorporating this policy measure into the two-tier price system improved the efficiency 
measured  from  the domestic market equilibrium, the efficiency measured from the 
international market price deteriorated. The level of protection was actually increased 
after acreage control was introduced,  even though farmers had  unabashedly shown 
strong disaffection toward this policy measure. In Phase 3, from 1970 to 1977, the level 
of protection had been unstable because of incidents such as the world food crisis in 
1973. After Phase 4, from 1978, the level of protection had become relatively stable.   12 
     After the 1980s, the level of protection gradually decreased. Among various other 
factors, two shifts clearly accelerating this decrease can be observed in 1987 and 1994. 
     First, in 1986, a demand from the RMA (Rice Milling Association) in the U.S. that 
Japan should open the rice market had a strong impact on the public opinions 
concerning protectionist farm policies, entailing several reforms in protectionist farm 
policies, although the demand was eventually withdrawn by the US government. The 
STC diagram clearly shows that this demand diminished the level of protection from 
1986 to 1987 when measured from the international market price. Nevertheless, the 
level of protection measured from the domestic equilibrium was not reduced at the same 
time. Usually, people are aware of a change of policy, especially the change of income 
redistribution or the change of protection level, through information transmitted through 
domestic market signals
5
    In 1993, the Blair-house Agreement (1992) between the U.S. and the EU urged 
Japan to accept the final resolution of the GATT. This acceptance entailed not only 
increasing rice importation as minimum access but also modifying several domestic 
policies. The STC diagram shows that this acceptance reduced the level of protection 
estimated from the international market price. At the same time, the level of protection 
estimated from the domestic equilibrium was also reduced. In this case, unlike the case 
in 1986, the Japanese capitulation to external pressure was apparently recognized by the 
general people. 
. This implies that the government successfully pretended to 
resist external pressure, but in reality reduced the level of protection, considering the US 
demands. 
                                                   
5  Besides this, if Japanese go abroad, they immediately notice the gap between the 
domestic price and the overseas price. However, few people travel frequently. Political 
movements and interest groups’ pressure are heavily influenced not by the comparison 
in international markets, but by the change in domestic markets and government 
spending.   13 
     These two observations suggest that external pressures have a distinct impact on 
the degree of protectionist farm policies, while the methods of protection depend on 
domestic political conditions. 
    After 1995, the level of protection has continued to decrease. However, that level is 
still not fallen to the 1955  level, the year of the first  observation.  In addition, the 
problem is that the efficiency of the policy mix was deteriorated. This is shown by the 
distance from the 45 degree angled line. That distance in the 2000s is longer than that in 
the 1950s, even though the level of protection is almost the same. 
 
Detailed analysis of who should shoulder the burden of producer protection 
 
Figure 5 shows the detailed analysis of who should shoulder the burden of producer 
protection. Consumer surplus reduction measured from the international market price is 
divided into two parts, the reduction purely caused by trade barriers such as tariff and 
import quota and the reduction (or increase) caused by domestic market distortions such 
as the two-tier price system. 
    Figure 5 shows five lines. The relationship among them, the parts of the burden 
and the income transfer to producers, is as follows: 
    CSTB + CSDP +GS - DWL = PS 
CSTB: amount of the reduction of consumer surplus brought about by trade barriers 
CSDP: amount of the reduction (increase) of consumer surplus brought about by 
domestic policy 
GS: amount of government spending 
DWL: dead weight loss 
PS: amount of the increase of producer surplus   14 
 
    First, with regard to the trend of producer surplus, the diagram shows that it had 
gradually increased, then, attained its peak around 1976 or 1977. After the peak, it has 
continued to shrink to this day. This tendency has already been observed in the STC 
analysis, and is reconfirmed here. 
    Secondly, the movement of the dead weight loss can also be indirectly observed as 
a distance between each year’s point on the STC diagram and the 45 degree angled line. 
Here, in Figure 5, this movement is more straightforwardly revealed as an individual 
line. It had increased from the start, implying that the efficiency of the policy mix of the 
year had deteriorated.  Efficiency became especially  low  after the acreage control 
program was introduced in 1970. The level of the dead weight loss reached the peak 
(the efficiency was worst) around 1993, and then it has decreased (the efficiency has 
improved) to this day. 
    The focal point of Figure 5 is the relationship among the other three lines, that is, 
the argument as to which parts shoulder  the burden of producers’  protection.  The 
amount of the reduction of consumer surplus brought about by trade barriers  is 
relatively large and no specific tendency can be found, though there were slight ups and 
downs presumably because of fluctuations of the exchange rate. 
    On the other hand, the amount of the reduction of consumer surplus brought about 
by domestic policy and government spending both show specific tendencies. Consumers, 
as far as domestic policy was concerned, were the position to be protected in the 1950s, 
1960s, and even several years in the 1970s. This position changed in the 1980s without 
consumers’ knowledge. In the 1990s and the 2000s, consumers have shouldered the 
burden of producers’ protection instead of the government, that is, instead of taxpayers. 
Conversely, government spending was drastically diminished in the 1980s. The burden   15 
of the government was relatively high during from the 1950s to the 1970s, however, it 






The result of the analyses suggests that external pressures have a considerable impact on 
the degree of protectionist farm policies. Still, the method of these protectionist policies 
differs  between  1987 and 1994. It may be affected by internal affairs, especially 
political situations. 
    In 1986, when the RMA in the U.S. demanded the opening of the rice market in 
Japan, the ruling party’s grip on power was strong, enabling the government to reduce 
its spending on the agricultural sector. The level of protection was maintained if it is 
calculated from the domestic equilibrium, though it was reduced if it is calculated from 
the international market price. Since the government possessed a great majority and was 
able to determine the policy mix with discretionary power, it was able to select the most 
suitable and most appropriate policy measures at the stage. Further, it may have been 
the case that the government was able to utilize external pressures for internal policy 
improvement. 
    In 1993, when Japan accepted the final resolution of the GATT Uruguay Round 
and a considerable volume of rice imports as minimum access was compulsorily 
executed, the political landscape was characterized by the newly established, unstable 
                                                   
6  This change was apparently affected by the financial and administrative reform of the 
government executed by former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone. He decisively 
carried out the reform, aiming at smaller government and cutting the budget, similar to 
the policy in the U.S. in the 1980s known as “Reaganomics.” Former President Ronald 
Reagan and Yasuhiro Nakasone were on friendly terms, so much so that their 
first-name-basis relationship became known as “Ron-Yasu relationship.”   16 
coalition government. From not only the results measured from the international market 
price but also those measured from the domestic market equilibrium, it was apparent 
that the government made a capitulation to external pressure. At that time, additionally, 
a large amount of compensation was paid in order to appease farmers’ grievances about 
the capitulation. This compensation was not a type of direct payment but a subsidy for 
land improvement. If this additional government spending is added to the STC analysis, 
overall efficiency at that time might be much worse. This can be considered a typical 
case when external pressure disturbs domestic policies and erodes their efficiency. 
    These two cases in which external pressures had a considerable impact on domestic 
protectionist farm policies  provide a good lessen to a  contemporary  burning  issue, 
Japan’s participation in the TPP. In order to consolidate a reciprocal partnership with the 
U.S., Japan should consider participating in the TPP in a positive light. Nevertheless, 
under the present situation, where the political power of the present government is not 
so  strong, the dispute between the industry sector and the farm sector over Japan’s 
participation ended in deadlock. Moreover, even if a certain policy measure alleviates 
the damage to the farm sector, it does not assure that such a policy change derived from 
external pressures promises to improve the domestic farm policy. Careful examination 




The result of the analyses suggests that external pressures have a considerable impact on 
domestic protectionist farm policies. In the case in 1986, when the RMA (Rice Milling 
Association) in the U.S. demanded that Japan should open the rice market, the STC 
diagram clearly shows that this external pressure diminished the level of protection.   17 
Nevertheless, the level of protection estimated from the domestic equilibrium was not 
reduced at that time. This implies that the government successfully pretended to resist 
external pressure, while in reality reduced the level of protection, considering the US 
demands. In 1994, when the UR agreement was finalized, the STC diagram shows that 
this acceptance reduced the level of protection. Then, the level of protection estimated 
from the domestic equilibrium was also reduced at the same time. These two 
observations suggest that external pressures clearly impact on the degree of protectionist 
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Figure 1A Stringent acreage control
（１９７０－７３、７８－present)





























Figure 1C Two-tier price without overproduction
（１９５５－１９６４）
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Government spending Producer surplus
Dead weight loss consumer surplus reduction (trade brriers)
Consumer surplus (domestic policy)